I. INTRODUCTION
978-1-4244-4313-0/09/$25.00 ©2009 IEEE characterized the associated error exponent. Viswanathan and Berger [2] first studied the quadratic Gaussian version in a similar regime, showing that for many agents the distortion fell as K / R where R is the sum rate and K is a constant independent of R, and they found bounds on the proportionality constant K. Oohama [3] showed that their inner bound was tight, and then [4] simultaneously with Prabhakaran, Tse, and Ramchandran [5] found the rate region for a finite number of agents and heterogeneous observations by the agents. All of these results used only the Berger-Tung inner bound [6] , [7] (also known as quantize-and-bin) to prove achievability. These results indicate that the Berger-Tung encoding cannot be improved upon for the quadratic Gaussian CEO problem. It is curious whether the essential Berger-Tung technique remains optimal when some agents are compromised.
The notion of Byzantine attack has its root in the Byzantine Generals Problem [8] , [9] , in which a clique of traitorous generals conspire to prevent loyal generals from reaching consensus. Byzantine attacks have been applied to many problems in networks, such as network coding [10] , [11] . Distributed source coding was investigated in [12] , which studied the problem of Slepian-Wolf [13] under Byzantine attack. The discrete memoryless CEO problem under Byzantine attack was investigated in [14] , [15] , both of which studied the error exponent originally characterized without traitors in [1] .
One could consider a range of models for network failures. For example, [10] investigated several different Byzantine models for network coding, and showed that different rates are achievable depending on the insidiousness of the compromised part of the network. For multiterminal source coding, perhaps the simplest model would be one in which failed nodes transmit nothing to the CEO, and therefore their identities are immediately known. Such a model was considered in [16] , in which the decoder sought to produce a higher quality estimate when fewer nodes fail; here, we are merely interested in the worst case performance with a limited number of failures. In this case, fully-identified failed nodes can be dealt with simply by decoding based on whatever information is received by the CEO. It is easy to see that the tightness of the BergerTung achievable region for the Gaussian CEO problem extends to this form of node failures. Even if failed nodes, instead of making themselves immediately known, transmit random information to the CEO, the problem is easy, because agents are expected to send correlated information, so a node sending o. Kosut and L. Tong are with Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853 a codeword independent from the rest is easy to identify and {oek2,lt35}@cornell.edu This work is supported in part by the National Science Foundation under ignore. On the other end of the spectrum, compromised nodes Award CCF-0635070 and the the Army Research Office under Grant ARO-may be Byzantine, with full access to all the sources the W911NF-06-1-0346.
ability to cooperate, and knowledge of the code. Also, honest
Abstract-The quadratic Gaussian CEO problem is studied when the agents are under Byzantine attack. That is, an unknown subset of agents is controlled by an adversary that attempts to damage the quality of the estimate at the Central Estimation Officer, or CEO. Inner and outer bounds are presented for the achievable rate region as a function of the fraction of adversarial agents. The inner bound is derived from a generalization of the Berger-Tung quantize-and-bin strategy, which has been shown to be tight in the non-Byzantine case. The outer bound has similarities to the Singleton bound in that the traitorous agents must be prevented from allowing two sources to result in the same transmitted codewords if their values are too far apart for the distortion constraint to be satisfied with a single estimate. The inner and outer bounds on the rate regions are used to find bounds on the asym ptotic proportionality constant in the limit of a large number of agents and high sum-rate. These bounds on the proportionality constant differ at most by a factor of 4.
Distributed systems are more likely to be susceptible to physical assault. A malicious intruder could seize a group of nodes and reprogram them to cooperate to obstruct the goal of the network, launching a so-called Byzantine attack. Alternatively, nodes may break down and begin transmitting spurious information. In either case, it is necessary to design algorithms and analyze performance in distributed problems when some of the nodes do not behave as they should.
Consider the CEO problem, a special case of multiterminal source coding, in which the fusion center or Central Estimation Officer (CEO), is interested in a sequence {X(t) }~1 but cannot observe it directly. Instead, each of L agents observe one of {Yk(t)}~l for k == 1, ... , L, where the Yk are conditionally independent given X. Without cooperating, the agents communicate encoded versions of their measurements to the CEO, which uses these transmissions to produce an estimate of X. We investigate a modification of this problem in which an unknown group of j3L agents are traitors. Traitors need not use the stipulated encoders to produce their transmissions to the CEO; indeed they may choose their codewords arbitrarily. We will study how j3 affects the quality of the CEO's estimate with Gaussian sources and quadratic distortion measure.
The CEO problem was first studied by Berger, Zhang, and Viswanathan [1] for discrete memoryless sources. They showed that for a large number of agents the achievable distortion fell exponentially with increasing sum-rate, and they traitor, then it may choose Ck any way it likes, based on full knowledge of the sources X, v-, the code, and cooperation with other traitors. The CEO's decoding function is from which it produces an estimate x» == 9 (C1, ... , CL).
For a given pair (z;", ynL), we define the maximum possible distortion over all possible actions of the traitors to be In this expression H runs over all possible sets of honest agents, where He is the set of traitors. We also maximize over CHc, the codewords sent by the traitors, ensuring that any potentially traitor actions are considered. Observe that even the choice of which agents to capture may be a function of the source values. Note also that in (2) ii" is a function of C L given by g, and CH is in tum a function of YH given by the
fi.
Let the expected distortion be We have assumed above that the decoder is deterministic. In general, that need not be the case, and for certain Byzantine problems it may be that randomization at the decoder can improve performance. However, the convexity of the quadratic distortion function implies it cannot do so for this problem. In particular, given any random decoder, consider the deterministic decoder that simply takes the expectation of the random estimate given the received codewords. This decoder cannot do worse than the random one, even though the traitors may change their behavior based on which decoder is to be used.
We now state our inner bound. In this paper, we present inner and outer bounds on the rate region for the quadratic Gaussian CEO problem under Byzantine attack. Our inner bound is an extension of the Berger-Tung inner bound, and can similarly be applied to a great variety of problems. As it is for the quadratic Gaussion CEO problem without traitors, we conjecture that this inner bound is tight. Our outer bound is a direct generalization of the converses in [3] and [5] . It also has elements of the Singleton bound from coding theory, in that we wish to prevent errors (or, in our case, codeword manipulation by the traitors) from bringing two points together that must remain distinguishable. A similar generalization of the Singleton bound was found in the context of network coding in [11] . We use our bounds on the rate region to bound the proportionality constant originally studied in [2] , giving the constant as a function of {3 to within a factor of 4. We also observe that our bounds on the proportionality constant have dramatically different behaviors for small {3, indicating that a small number of traitors may have an unexpectedly harsh effect on performance.
The paper is structured as follows. Section II formally presents the model and states our results. The inner bound is proved in Section III, the outer bound in Section IV, and the bounds on the asymptotic constant in Section V. We conclude in Section VI.
Notation. The superscript n denotes n-Iength sequences 
At (3 == 0, the two bounds meet at O"Jv / (20".k), matching the result of [3] . They also both diverge at {3 == 1/2. The ratio between them is monotonically increasing in {3 and is never more than 4.
We do not make the same conjecture for our upper bound on K as we did for our inner bound on the rate region. The complexity of the statement of Theorem 1 makes it difficult to calculate the best value of K that would result from it, and it may be possible to improve on the upper bound in (12). However, though we omit the proof of this in the interest of space, it is true that any upper bound on K resulting from Theorem 1 would have no better behavior for small {3 than the upper bound in (12). That is, if our conjecture on the tightness of Theorem 1 holds, then for (3 « 1,
20"x
Compare this to our lower bound from Theorem 3, which states that for small (3, 2 2 O"Jv
Observe that (13) increases rapidly with {3 near (3 compared to (14).
of the CEO's estimate can never improve over the a priori variance. The reason for this is that once traitors control at least half of the network, it is impossible for the CEO to distinguish the group of traitors from the group of honest agents, so the traitors can simply report a completely different value of X than the true one, and the CEO will never know which one is the truth. For this reason, we focus mainly on the nontrivial regime (3 < 1/2.
We now define the asymptotic proportionality constant. Let D(R, L) be the minimum achievable distortion for L agents where the sum-rate is at most R. In the case that all agents have the same quality of observation (i.e. O"Jv
. (CT t A;). ( 
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We offer the following intuition for this result. Agent k will send to the CEO a corrupted version of its measurement represented by Ui: These will be designed so that if all agents were honest, the covariances between them would be
However, due to the presence of the traitors, the joint distribution of X, U L that actually occurs, which is represented by the covariance matrix in (7), may not match the distribution that would result with no traitors. This alternative distribution is parameterized by E and A, where E is the covariance matrix of UL, and A is the covariance vector between X and UL .
Since the CEO can observe only U L, it can only recover E, from which it must choose an estimator. From E, the CEO can identify possible sets of honest agents as the ones satisfying (5), because the honest agents are guaranteed to transmit information using the proper distribution. However, there may be several possible sets that are indistinguishable to the CEO, and for each set many possibilities for A. The CEO must construct its estimate by choosing constants Ck that satisfy the distortion constraint for each of these possibilities, as (6) stipulates.
This inner bound is a natural extension of the Berger-Tung inner bound for the non-Byzantine setting. This bound is tight in the non-Byzantine setting, and we conjecture that our inner bound is likewise tight, in which case the rate region would be given by conditions (A) and (B) above. However, this region does not match that of our outer bound, stated as follows. 
The region specified in our outer bound in Theorem 2 is identical to the rate region for the non-Byzantine problem given in [4] , [5] except that the two conditions on {I, ... , L} have been replaced with conditions on 8 for all sets of size 
QD(X,YS ) == {(xn,ys): 3y7f I\H2,y7f2\HI: (x n, YR I) E SD(X, Y HI), (x n, YR2) E SD(X, Y H2)}. (25)
That is, QD (X, Y s ) is the set of pairs (z:", Ys) such that x» may achieve the distortion constraint (depending on the Y values) if either H 1 or H 2 is the set of honest agents. Because the S D sets have probability nearly one, so does QD . Given a codeword Cs, let QD(Xlcs) be the set of x" such that (xn,ys) E QD(X, Y s) for some Ys for which f s (Ys) == cs· It follows from the high probability property of QD(X, Y s) that QD(Xlcs) also has high probability conditioned on cs being sent. Hencẽ h(xnIGs) ::::;~maxlogVol(Qv(XlcHns)) + Ii (26) n n Cs
This is the set of all (x n , YR i ) pairs for which x: achieves the distortion constraint no matter what the traitors do. Because we assume that distortion D is achieved with probability nearly one, the probability of the set SD(X, Y Hi) is also nearly one. Now define with probability at least 1 -E, because we can always repeat the code multiple times and apply the law of large numbers. 
IV. OUTER BOUND PROOF where E-----* 0 as E -----* o. Therefore, by (6)
Taking the limit as E -----* 0 proves achievability. IE~,A (X flnH -X) == IE(X flnH -X) .
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VI. CONCLUSION We presented inner and outer bounds for the rate region of the quadratic Gaussian CEO problem as a function of the size of a subset of agents reprogrammed by an adversary. These bounds were used to bound the asymptotic proportionality constant for many agents and high sum-rates.
We conjectured that our inner bound on the rate region is tight, which would indicate that our upper bound on the proportionality constant is approximately tight for a small fraction of traitors. In particular, if our conjecture holds then the proportionality constant goes like 1 + 2V7J near {3 == 0, as opposed to our lower bound of 1 + 2{3. Hence, if our conjecture is true, then a small number of traitors would have a surprisingly damaging effect on the quality of the CEO's estimate.
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The Cauchy-Shwartz inequality and (29) can now be used to show The proof of the lower bound in (12) using Theorem 2 is straightforward and we omit it. We proceed to prove the upper bound in (12) using Theorem 1.
For a given sum-rate R, we must specify rk and Ck to satisfy conditions (A) and (B) 2 • Since the CEO produces just one estimate given a set of input messages, the very same estimate in, must satisfy~d(x'" , in) ::; D. Hence, by the triangle inequality, for any xn,x'n E QD(Xlcs), IIx n -x'nll 2 ::; 2~.
(28)
That is, QD(Xlcs) has diameter at most 2JTJ5. The following lemma bounds the volume of subsets of JR.n as a function of their diameter. The proof, which we omit, makes use of the Brunn-Minkowski inequality.
Lemma 1: The volume of any subset of JR.n is no more than that of the n-ball with the same diameter.
Hence, the volume of Q D (X Ics) is no more than that of an n-ball with radius JTJ5, which is less than (27reD)n/2.
Applying this to (26) gives (23), completing the proof.
